Answering the big question over Hanover

I agree with comments, hope they are right, however the glossy advertising, when it was obvious they were in trouble, is somewhat offensive.

A investor

I agree with Phil's comments. Hanover has always seemed to be a well-run operation. I'm reminded of the story of the prosperous shopkeeper who, when told that a recession was coming, cut back on all his advertising until one day he found he had no customers and had to shut his business. "See, they were right all along - there is a recession", he told everyone.

It's become a self-fulfilling prophecy for the finance industry as well - with every company that goes bust, more people get scared about investing in finance companies, so their fund flows reduce, their margins get tighter, their capacity to lend dries up, the companies they lend to can't refinance so they default on repayments to their finance company, which eventually goes bust, making more people scared to invest ..... and so on.

This gradual collapse of the finance industry will have a dire impact on the economy as a whole. The finance companies lend where the banks cannot/will not go. When companies like Hanover start to feel the pinch, it's time for Government to step in and shore up confidence in the sector.

It's all very well to blame the Govt. How about the trustees, the accountants, and all the other Guarantors that have had their fingers in the till, as well as the financial advisors, and the television advertisers who accept their sheckels right up to the end. These types should be just as answerable to the public as the prosecuted carrion crows of the Financial industry.

Regards
John Piggot

The question I would like answered is what has the Trustee done so far to protect the first ranking debenture holders interests in Hanover? Has the Trustee been taking an active role in the stewardship of Hanover's liquidity? Has the Trustee bothered to obtain an independent analysis of Hanover's position?

The comments that Hanover has good management and a good quality loan book is humbug. Finance companies with good management and a good quality loan book don't default, yes DON'T DEFAULT on their sacred obligation to pay investors interest when due and repay principal when due.

I might just squeeze a bit of sympathy for Hotchin and Watson if they offered their personal guarantees and personal assets to the investors who will soon be the poorer for investing and trusting their money to Hanover.

Your comment about;

"what is worth noting, and something that others will miss, is that suspending interest payments, and rolling them up into later payments, matches what is happening with lenders."

I hope you don't mean it's now OK to default so long as other lenders are doing it or if your borrowers can't pay then it's OK to put the burden on the poor investors who lent the money in the first place. These notions will appear repugnant to the average Hanover investor.

Hanover didn't suddenly wake up on Thursday morning and decide they were in trouble. Hanover has known for a long time they were in trouble yet they continued business as usual trying to suck in as much money as possible with their slick advertising.

I agree whole heartedly with your comment "From what I know these guys have the most to lose in this situation and they want to preserve as much of Hanover’s equity as they can." I hope they don't succeed in protecting their interests at the expense of the first ranking debenture holders.

Your guess that Hanover will live to fight another day might be a day several light years from now.

An article appeared recently in the Company Director magazine published by the Australian Institute of Company Directors which I couldn’t less pass without comment, and without suggesting that New Zealanders take a close look at the message contained therein. This has particular relevance when considering the questions being asked over roles of the various parties in the New Zealand investment environment.
The article was written by Mr Tony D’Aloisio who Chairman of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). Now, I’ve never met Mr. D’Aloisio and there is nothing in my remarks which are intended to be of a personal nature – rather my observations and comments are directed towards the content of the article on a number of issues.
Firstly, Mr D’Aloisio tells us that he has commissioned research to seek the views of 1250 stakeholder respondents “who were asked what they thought AISC did well and where it needed to improve”. Having spent most of 2007 working with the inimitable Bill Taylor, Chairman and founder of W.A. Taylor & Associates, it strikes me from my time there that approaching a research brief from the standpoint that “our stakeholders saw us as quite a good regulator” is a remit fraught with all sorts of inappropriate and potentially unrepresentative conclusions. Starting from the premise that you know the attitudes of the sample population before the research is conducted is somewhat problematic.
If, for example, Mr D’Aliosio is referring to the stakeholders represented by the HIH policyholders, they might express a different view to that promulgated by ASIC Chairman in his article.
If he is referring to the stakeholders represented by the senior management of Citibank and the Australian taxpayers who had to withstand the futile and flawed case brought against the merchant banking arm of Citibank for allegedly insider trader during the Toll/Patrick takeover transaction, then again there might be a contrast in their attitudes toward ASIC being “quite a good regulator”.
If he is referring to the investors in Westpoint who have suffered substantial losses by placing their money in a regulated organisation recommended by regulated advisers, then again these individuals might not endorse the view stated by the Chairman.

Secondly, it may come as a surprise to Mr D’Aloisio that some stakeholders regard ASIC as adversarial and ineffective. Now I accpet that the response from ASIC could well be that it’s task is not to prevent such collapses as HIH and Westpoint occurring, and that it has a responsibility to challenge inappropriate market practices where these are perceived to be inappropriate by ASIC management and staff. For a response to the latter, one need only refer to the remarks passed by the Australian Judge in dismissing ASIC’s case against Citibank. And if a regulator is not tasked with preventing investors from being taken to the cleaners by bad management, investment shysters, and other malevolent parties, what is the use of regulatory bodies such as ASIC? Export that same question to NZ and what should the role and responsibilities of the NZ regulator be in protecting stakeholder interests in investment offerings such as finance houses, managed funds, and first ranking debenture issues?

Later in the article, Mr D’Aloisio refers to changes being made to deliver benefits. After having identified four principal priorities – retail investors, insider trading, market manipulation, and disclosure – he identifies that there needs to be “18 outwardly-focussed stakeholder teams covering the financial economy”. Furthermore, that “the move to one level of senior management involves reducing 54 senior positions to 41". Contemplate the people and financial metrics of this in a New Zealand scenario.
As mentioned previously, retail investors are entitled to question the effectiveness of the regulator in the face of the Westpoint controversy, as are the taxpayers who had to foot the A$2m bill only to have ASIC given a snotty nose by the courts for raising a pointless and ill-advised prosecution in the Toll/Patrick “insider trading” situation. So in two of the four principle areas of focus, some would argue that ASIC performance has been far from “quite good”. In fact, a number of stakeholders might not present the affirmatives which I suspect will have emerged from the survey. This is not to impugn Allen Consulting Group which is a highly competent and well respected research organisation. But perhaps rather than asking the respondents how well ASIC is performing, it might be more worthwhile to identify what characteristics stakeholders would wish to see from a regulatory body such as ASIC and ask those respondents to score ASIC performance against benchmarked expectations. The results may not be too comfortable, but they are likely to be more representative, constructive and useful.
Perhaps some of these stakeholder expectations might touch on prevention of consumer losses from financial organisation collapses or consulting with stakeholder where established practices in the financial services industry give rise to concerns over integrity and transparency. Prevention, of course, is less dramatic and eye-catching than cure, but it so much more effective.
New Zealanders should take note of the numbers of management and staff involved with regulating the Australian industry – although it is to be noted that the Chairman does not quantify numbers in the 18 teams mentioned – and I’d suggest that more effective instruments be deployed to prevent consumers and stakeholders being disenfranchised or otherwise prejudiced as has been the experience in Australia. After all, the Investment Funds Management organisations were selling out of finance company holdings long before the public were able to get a hint of a credit crunch and consequent collapses. Rather than invest in 18 teams and 41 senior managers, ASIC and, hopefully, our NZ counterpart, will invest in the same sophisticated and sensitive financial forecasting models deployed by those organisations that exited those investments which subsequently left thousands of Mum and Dad Kiwi investors flat broke.

Surely no huge surprise that Hanover has suspended business - probably amazing that they left it so long........but that is no comfort to yet more Kiwis who are now wondering about their financial futures.
It is a simple fact of life that these businesses rely on cash flow - and equally obviously this would NEVER have been explained to clients when investing either by an adviser or the finance company and suffice to say that if you are in this industry no matter how well managed or how good your book of business is when confidence goes it does not discriminate!
Without doubt it is very much time for the NZ Government to take a leaf out of the US methods and start supporting this sector in some way - this is so important to the everyday man in the street that this Government [the Government these people voted in] should now take action to help them - surely a principal of Government in any event.
The actions taken by the US Federal authorities in supporting private financial institutions, maintaining confidence is to be applauded and is paying dividends now - NZ Government please don't just take note, take action NOW.

Phil, I disagree with your analysis of the Hanover "situation". Most finance companies in New Zealand have made the same mistake and experienced the same outcome as those financial firms who have gone spectacularly bust on numerous occasions throughout history. Recent examples include the S&L crisis in the US and the Great Depression. Essentially finance companies were the late cycle beneficiaries of cheap and easy credit. They 'borrowed short' and 'lent long' (it is simply incorrect to maintain that their asset maturity profile matched the liability maturity profile when you consider the lack of liquidity in the underlying assets - essentially property development). In the late part of a very long term economic cycle (I'm talking circa 50 years - a Kondratieff cycle period) inflation rises and credit growth peaks. At such a stage there is a high level of confidence that real estate prices will increase forever. Central Banks respond by raising interest rates to combat inflation. Heavily indebted consumers are squeezed, asset prices collapse, credit contracts viciously, liquidity evaporates and a recession/depression ensues. Debt and inflated asset prices are purged in a catastrophic manner. The thin veneer of equity in the multitude of finance companies (who were incidentally highly correlated in terms of their lending practices) is cruelly exposed and a bust ensues. The solution is a massive infusion of capital (presumably from the owners) or investors have to accept the paltry proceeds from the realisation of the underlying security (that is, the sale of the real estate at depressed prices). Although this may be difficult for many investors to accept, the reality is that the investors have in effect placed their money into high risk property development at a very late stage of the credit cycle. The outcome for investors in such a situation is usually very poor. Hanover is no exception.

Mike Coll - Good call. The trouble is, the NZ government will not take action, they have no expertise to know what they should do, and they won't listen to people who do know. They are impervious to the wishes of the market until election time.

This is a horrible time for Hanover investors. The solid, dependable theme that their advertising material adopted has to be highlighted as a major breach of securities legislation as it was clearly misleading to potential investors. I am given to understand that the penalties are severe and I hope a very heavy book indeed is thrown at those responsible.

However on a lesser level (but still unpleasant) are the seemingly random "expert" media commentators that tell us about how this was totally expected and alarm bells had been ringing for some time. How does that help the investors? All it seems to do is inflate the ego of the person making the statement.

This kind of thing makes the public feel like there is an inner circle of financial experts that are privvy to special information that mere mortals do not get a chance to access - and they will stand by and allow shonkiness to thrive. It helps fuel the impression that financial services outfits conspire together to rip off the public.

I think a little more humility and constructive suggestions to remedy things is called for if the wider sector stands any chance of regaining public confidence.

As a family member of an investor (in Hanover and Dorchester) it's been a tough month. I cannot understand why the media beats up every time a company gets into difficulty, especially when you could easily argue that Hanover (& Dorchester) are taking this action to avoid a total collapse. Debenture holders will be the ones to decide these companies' fate moving forward. I only hope the 'circling vultures' remember who ultimately loses if the worst case eventuates...

Phil, your comments must be to stimulate reader comment or to save the face of Hanover's management and owners, because what a load of weak rubbish. I would not be surprised if Hanover investors got 30 cents or less back on their investment. I will be driving passed Hanover's big hole in the ground in the weekend which will be that way for a while I suspect.

Phil it appears to me that to come up with the conclusions that you have you have either had too many free lunches at Hanover's expense or you are trying to provoke feedback. The only comment I agree with is that the move "is as much about protecting themselves as dealing with investors' interests."

To say that the business has good management and a good loan book is entirely contrary to what has occurred. It appears to me that much of the 'good' management has left in recent years. Some after very short periods at the company - never a good sign.

The key point is that the owners were very happy to take out large dividends when the business was profitable (even though at the time the last dividend was taken one would suspect that issues were already starting to arise) yet have to this point been totally unwilling to put capital back in when it has been desperately needed.

Maybe if this had occurred the business would not have been forced to sell off loans at a discount which must bring into question the company's ability to pay back all that is owed. Given these issues it is hard to understand why a freeze was not put in place earlier other than to give the owners more time to protect there own positions.

Lets hope in this case that the owners do turn out to be the 'good guys' and save investors from inevitable losses. Unfortunately actions (which count for much more than words) to date would not point towards this conclusion.

The quality of the loan book is the critical aspect. If it is A grade, defaults are minimal, regardless of the markets.
Property developers rely on upward ratcheting sale prices to make a profit, as few buy with a proper margin on purchase.. A well run finance provider should have the tools to keep in front of the markets. The RBNZ provided constant warnings. The prudent investors appraise the risk. The risk was getting to great and the only reason for low re investment rates. Seems the prudent investors are smarter than the finance company management. Lending money who ever you are is a business; there are no free lunches in business.
I do not know the quality of the loan book and my guess if management have no real idea either, that is why the failure has occurred. An independent person should appraise the loan book quality in the first instance.
My guess is a few larger lenders have already done this and the situation is terminal.

Hanover's position is no surprise to me,as information from very creditable Queenstown circles in February 2007 was quite definitely thumbs down,and from then on I advised anyone I came across with investments in Hanover not to renew their investments.
However,those who sell financial products for a commission seemed to have a template of locking investors in for two year terms,so withdrawal was not always possible.
I talked yesterday to a person who thanked me for last year giving him this advice,and for encouraging him to withdraw his ''portfolio" from the control of his ''advisor'' and controlling it himself.
By December 2007,a lot of ''advisors'' had obviously caught the scent,and were not renewing.
There are a lot of people in and out of Queenstown in a year,and accordingly the Jacks Point Subdivision, and the ''Hole in the Ground'' became well known to many.
Another point I would make is that the level of equity being contibuted to these finance companies by their owners is woefully inadequate.
What that means is it is the outside investors who are taking the risk.
They are in a near equity position in terms of risk but receive no super profits if a company has good fortune.
Those superprofits go to the ''entrepeneurs''.
In this respect Brian Gaynor has an excellent ''open letter to Lianne Dalziel'' in today's media.
In regard to Hanover ''onselling their properties'',why can't they onsell them?
Hanover either has a reasonable security position in regard to each of their loans,or it hasn't.
Simple stuff.
I recall watching BBC World news one morning[Compared with TV NZ News it is like Einstein versus kindergarten]and a retired English banker was being interviewed in regard to that English Bank which had the ''run on funds''--Northern??.He said that when he was a banker they would lend up to 75% of valuation on a house,but Northern ? were lending 125% of valuation.
I accept that the average investor in Hanover would not have understood that property developers do not necessarily pay their mortgage interest every month as a house owner does.
And of course you could not expect anyone selling financial products for a living to point these sort of "minor details '' out, just as I prior to the new regulations on disclosure,I had never seen any such salesperson divulge interesting information such as what income they were deriving from sales of particular products.
I don't know what quality loanbook Hanover had,but what I do know is that we will find out whether Eric Watson and his mates are Alan Hubbards or whether they are Flash Harrys,by whether we see the colour of their money to pay all of the outside investors their interest and principal in full.
Dave Henderson was one of the keynote speakers at the South Island Dairy Farmers conference relating his story of how he beat IRD.
Someone said to me yesterday''Hanover gave him $70 million and all he has is a hole in the ground which would have only cost about $2 million to get.Where has the rest of the money gone ?''
There are also rumours that John Darby Partners[The developer at Jacks Point]has bought Hanover's 200 sections back of them at a substantial discount---This will show up on the public records in due course--Hanover was offering these sections to the public for $425,000 each.Multiply this by 200 equals $85 million .
According to Brian Gaynor's article,Hanover's equity was around $40 million as per their last published accounts.
I hope Eric and his mates do not have a social conscience like Rod of "Cocktails on the Corporate yacht for the financial products salespeople" fame.
Phillip is obviously throwing out a big lure with the equity reference.
What minimal equity Hanover had,is gone,and with the way capital markets are poised for the medium term,their chances of trading on are not bright.
Time to follow Fay RitchWhite's example and reside offshore.
Unless of course Eric and the boys become like Mother Theresa.
I did also make the comment that having a man who was once seen driving a $300,000 Merc convertible around Christchurch on the board of Hanover,was enough for me to give it the thumbs down.
I've personally got money invested with South Canterbury Finance.
Alan Hubbard is a workaholic non Flash Harry type.
I don't like show ponies and the cocktail set.
Kind of like the Oracle of Omaha.
Now I musn't forget the issue of dividends.
Yes I did raise this issue with Phillip's good friend and mine,Chris Lee.
The same issue had greatly concerned me with Provincial Finance.
Chris then quite correctly published an opinion that Hanover's owners needed to introduce more of their own capital.
This means actually having more paid up share capital,not declaring a dividend and using it to repay related party loans.
Too much to the owners compared to what investors were receiving.
Eric and the boys will not want a receiver appointed,as there would be an investigation of such matters as whether the company was solvent at the time of declaration.
Whether they have used the proceeds of such dividends to repay related party loans,or whether the funds have just been stripped out,doesn't concern me.
Either way they have benefited to the disadvantage of debenture holders.
I also wonder how those related party loans would rank in an insolvency compared to the debenture holders.
I do not have the latest group financial statements ''As disclosed to the registrar,which are noted as not being the same accounts as disclosed on the public website'',but would expect that these would rank below debenture holders.
If that is the case,then the owners have clearly had an advantage at the expense of the public.
We can have a moratoriam as we had with MFS Pacific Finance,but if the company's assets consist of shop fronts on a Western Movie Set,it doesn't serve much purpose.
My guess is that if Eric and the boys get their personal cheque books out,Hanover will survive.
If not,my guess is that it is all over.

I am not an expert in financial matters by any means. But I thought it would have been obvious with reports that Hanover was having trouble with loans that they were heading for trouble.
Another thing I don’t understand why would you invest in a finance company no matter how strong when they are only paying .5 to 1 % above bank deposits? For example
South Canterbury Finance. For 3 months to a year

Also I don’t understand how company lent 50 million for example can have the debt go away as it seems. Why aren’t directors of companies are made responsible for debts that occur, maybe if they were then they would pay more attention to what is going on. If an individual lends money they are hounded till they pay it back.
It does surprise me that the Government is not doing something about finance companies when over 2 billion dollars has in effect been taken out of circulation in effect and much may never be returned to investors.
In my opinion the owners /directors of finance companies should be made to sell all their assets to help pay back the investors that have been burnt. Put them in the same boat as the investors.
Now what makes you think I have been burnt by finance company !

I saw on Campbell Live last week a fellow being interviewed and he mentioned that the Hanover chaps also have a loan from the 'vultures of last resort', Fortress. I have since heard a Fortress loan figure of $100 million mentioned in learned circles.

If indeed there is such a loan, does this rank equally or ahead of debenture holders? If it ranks ahead of debenture holders, then I fear that we could have a situation like Capital and Merchant Finance where investors are only likey to get back a mere 8 cents in the dollar because of the prior ranking of Fortress' loan.

Perhaps the Hanover fellows could (hopefully) reassure debenture holders re. the Fortress loan and its ranking?

I have some major issues with your piece.

1. To say hanover has a good loan portfolio is laughable. The bad loans reported in the press are only a taste of things to come. Hanover has numerous other bad debts on its books but clearly doesn't want to foreclose on these prior to the restructuring vote. The loans to Hanover Property (or whatever they are called now) is downright dodgy. Anyone in the industry will tell you those properties (e.g. matarangi, Jacks Point, etc) are extremely marginal investments. I would be extremely surprised to see those loans aver repaid.

2. Taking Debenture Owners Cash: Hotchin/Watson have taken in the order of $150-$180million in cash from this business either through dividends and realted party loans. Be quite clear - this is debenture holders cash. As soon as the December dividend was extracted it was clear this business was doomed. The owners extracted the cash out (dividends and related party loans) knowing full well the business model was doomed and their loan portfolio was rubbish. This was the last time they could legitimately take their money out and they knew it. I am sorry but Watson/Hotchin have cut and run.

3. REstructuring Vote: You watch. I bet Watson/Hotchin will offer to put a derisory amount of the $150-$180million (dividends and related party loans) back into the company as part of the restructuring. No doubt they will cry poor. They will then take this back out in fees and salaries all the while using Hanover to prop up their private property portfolio. Debenture holders have been shafted quite frankly. If you vote for their restructuring you deserve to lose your money. Put another way, who do you trust more? - Hotchin/Watson or a reciever acting in your interests.

I may sound like i have something against these guys but the fact is i do not. I am just sick of these guys taking advantage of honest mums and dads who are financially illiterate. I have a good understanding of the finance company business model and the NZ property development market.

The repeated cries for help from the NZ government to bail out poor investments and poorly managed finance companies is not going to happen for several reasons:

1) What's in it for the government? Bailing out potentially up to NZD17bn of investors funds? or stepping in with support in August 2008 and take on responsibility for future failings? Once the finance company storm has calmed down and stabilized, the government via the RBNZ is likely to tighten the regulatory framework for finance companies and improve, hopefully, stringent advisor accreditation and disclosure. In the meantime, no one wants to catch a falling knife.

2) Ultimately, investment decisions are made by investors and not advisors. In the case of Hannover, i think ever since finance companies started to get into trouble, Hanover was on industry's people's mind due to their asset concentration, low capitalization and ownership / structure. It is a shame, thought, that some advisors might have been tempted by commission rather then investor well-being.

3) Well, contrary to what a lot of people, including senior managers of reputable companies told me over the last few years, real estate values can drop significantly. It is beyond me that people believe what they want to believe rather than doing some simple research / home work, which would also prove that NZ is not that different from other markets in the world.

Hanover Group chief executive Bruce Gordon welcomed the rating review and said the company's priorities over the past year included "maintenance of a conservative cash position, selected lending on quality assets, and rigorous debt collection and provisioning."

This was only a few months back and since they have cut investors off at the knees. These are long-term investors and people investing to pay for a trip of a lifetime or for retirement and in many cases just to struggle by!

Mr Gordon can't 'sugar coat' things now as the CEO of Hanover he needs to gives investors HONEST answers and not thinking of themselves first the company needs to come clean.

I don't believe Mr Gordon's dribble now and think it is a time saving ruse whilst they line their own pockets!
Too bad for anyone else huh? You'll be right jack!

What are my chances of being repaid my 2 yr term deposit on May 5th 09

only waY IS TO LQUIDATE BEFORE IT IS ALL SPENT BY THE "MANAGEMENT"!